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EVIDENCE-PRESENT SENSE AND COMMON
SENSE: STRETCHING THE 803(1) HEARSAY

EXCEPTION TO ITS LIMITS-UNITED STATES V
HIENG, 679 F.3D 1131 (9TH CIR. 2012)
In law school evidence classes across the United States, second
year students grapple with the rules governing hearsay exceptions: business
records, statements made for the purpose of medical treatment, statements
made by party opponents, etc.' Although the present sense impression
exception is one of the rules least feared by law students, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted a unique situation that
would be prime for any law school exam in United States v. Hieng.2 In a
mere four sentences, a majority of the three-judge panel held that hearsay
calculations tallying the number of marijuana plants officers destroyed,
which totaled over 1000 plants, qualified under the present sense
impression exception.3 However, a vehement concurrence argued the
exception had been stretched to its breaking point. 4 This comment will
discuss the different approaches to the present sense impression exception
used by the majority and concurring opinions, and then argue that courts
should avoid such extreme rule bending by keeping the present sense
impression out of the past.5
I

See generally FED. R. EVID. 803 (enumerating exceptions to rule against hearsay). The

Federal Rules of Evidence contain twenty-three exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Id.
Hearsay is defined under Rule 801 as "a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement." FED. R. EVID. 801(C). See generally Anderson v. United States,
417 U.S. 211, 220-21 (1974) (discussing hearsay rule).
2 679 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012). See id. at 1145-46 (Berzon, J., concurring) (arguing present
sense impression exception did not apply to hearsay testimony given at trial).
3 Id. at 1142; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (defining present sense impression exception to
rule against hearsay). The relevant text of the rule reads: "Present Sense Impression. A
statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the
declarant perceived it." Id.
4 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1147 (Berzon, J., concurring). The holding of this case extends the
present sense impression exception beyond its original understanding and purpose. See id.
(arguing present sense impression inapplicable in case at bar); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1)
advisory committee's note ("The underlying theory of Exception [paragraph] (1) is that
substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or
conscious misrepresentation." (alteration in original)); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96,
105-06 (1933) (detailing hearsay example); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 10 So. 2d 83, 83-85 (Fla.
1942) (same).
5 See Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 FLA.
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On August 28, 2007, agents from the Fresno County Sheriff's
Department discovered a large marijuana growing operation at a residence
leased by the defendant, Orm Hieng. The marijuana plants were planted in
fifteen to twenty rows at a vineyard on the premises, as well as within the
home.7 After the defendant and another individual were taken into custody,
the officers simultaneously tallied and destroyed the plants. 8 Officers went
down each row and either cut or ripped the plants from the ground, keeping
a mental tally of the plants they had eradicated. 9 Once an entire row was
eliminated, each officer would report the number of plants removed to
Fresno County Sherriff's Department Detective Jensen, who then recorded
the figures.' 0
Based on the evidence seized from his home and surrounding
property, Orm Hieng was charged with intentionally conspiring to
manufacture a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)." During trial, the investigating detectives could not
recall the exact number of plants they individually counted and destroyed,
but testified that they gave their total to Detective Jensen, who then
recorded the tally. 12 Detective Jensen testified he kept an accurate count of
the plants destroyed based upon the officers' statements and put the final
tally of 1109 marijuana bushes in his report.'3 Hieng was convicted by a
jury and sentenced to ten years in prison, the minimum sentence required

ST. U. L. REv. 907, 919 (2001) ("While the rule does not specify a time interval and even
contemplates a 'slight lapse' of time, the intent and spirit of the rule is that admissibility ends
with the exceedingly short time period before reflective thought can occur."); see also infra note
28 and accompanying text (discussing various contemporaneity requirements used by courts).
6 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1136-37.
7 Id at 1136. There were a total of 1039 marijuana plants growing in the vineyard. Id. Each
row contained between fifty and seventy plants. Id. An additional seventy plants were inside the
home. Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. The record does not state how many officers were involved in this operation. See id.
(outlining plant destruction procedure without noting number of officers involved).
10 Id.

11See Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1135 (noting substance at issue was over 1000 marijuana plants);
see also 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (2006) (detailing statute covering possession with intent to distribute
controlled substance). The relevant part of the statute reads:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute,
or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance.
§ 841(a).
12 Hieng, 679
13 Id.

F.3d at 1136.
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by the statute.14 Hieng subsequently appealed his conviction to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 5
Many modern legal academics credit the legal scholar James
Bradley Thayer for developing the present sense impression exception to
the rule against hearsay in the Nineteenth Century. 16 However, prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, relatively few
jurisdictions recognized the present sense impression exception. 17 In one
early case, Texas acknowledged such an exception in Houston Oxygen Co.
v. Davis,8 where the Commission of Appeals held that statements made by

passengers about a passing vehicle were admissible as a present sense
impression because the report was made at the moment of observation,
there was no time of calculation or misstatement, and was made to a
passenger who also viewed the incident.19 Another early case decided in
Florida, Tampa Electric Co. v. Getrost,20 held hearsay testimony that arose

from a phone call made just prior to a man being killed in a workplace was
properly admitted as a present sense impression. 21 The court specifically
14 Id. at 1135 (detailing defendant's sentencing); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii)
(2006) (providing minimum sentence often years). The number of marijuana plants must be over
1000 to qualify for the ten-year minimum sentence. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii).
15 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1135. After he was convicted, Hieng simultaneously appealed the
decision to United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and filed a motion to vacate his
sentence under 28 U.S.C § 2255. See Hieng v. United States, No. CV-F-10-1620 OWW, 2010
WL 3583163, at *1 (ED. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010) (denying defendant's motion to vacate sentence);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (detailing prisoner's right to challenge sentence imposed in
violation of Constitution or United States laws). The motion court denied Hieng's motion
because he did not make a showing of the "most unusual circumstances" that would support
simultaneous direct appeal and filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Hieng, 2010 WL
3583163, at *1 (quoting Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988)).
16 See Teree E. Foster, Present Sense Impressions: An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 299, 301-03 (1979) (crediting James Bradley Thayer with creating modem present sense
impression exception (citing James Bradley Thayer, Bedingfield's Case Declarationsas a Part
of the Res Gestae, 14 AM. L. REV. 1, 10 n.1, 83-107 (1881))); Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense
Impression Exception to the Rule AgainstHearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869,
871 (1981) (same).
17 See Foster, supra note 16, at 304-05 (discussing development of present sense impression
exception through academic routes rather than common law); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay
Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 327-28 (2009) (discussing development of present sense impression
hearsay exception).
18 161 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942).
19 Id. at 476-77 (holding hearsay statements admissible). The statements at issue in Hous.

Oxygen Co. occurred when a passenger said the driver of a speeding car must have been drunk,
and it was likely they would get into an accident if they kept driving in that manner. Id. at 476.
20 10 So. 2d 83, 85 (Fla. 1942).
21 Id. at 85 (discussing factual circumstances surrounding hearsay statements). In Getrost,an
assistant for an electrical company gave hearsay testimony from his supervisor, a man killed in an
electrical accident. Id. at 84-85. The supervisor had called the assistant and claimed he ordered
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noted "there was no occasion for [the statement] to have resulted from
reflection or premeditation., 22 However, the Supreme Court narrowly
defined what counts as a "present" impression in Shepard v. United
States,23 where the Court held statements that "faced backward" about a
24
past event do not fall into the hearsay exception.
Notwithstanding early hesitations, forty-four states have adopted
the present sense impression exception into their rules of evidence. 25 The
key premise behind the exception is the close temporal link between the

time of the observation and the time of the statement, ensuring the
statement has substantial contemporaneity to the event described.26 Despite
the focus on chronological proximity, courts have found "substantial

contemporaneity" when the statement occurred between ten and twentythree minutes after the described event. 2 Moreover, how a court defines an
the power to be cut to the lines on which he was working; however, the power was not cut and the
supervisor received a powerful electrical shock. Id. at 83-84. The Florida Supreme Court
focused on the assistant's intimate knowledge of the procedures involved with working on
electrical wires and the contemporaneity of the statements as sufficient indicators of reliability.
Id. at 84-85.
22

Id. at 85.

23 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
24 Id. at 105-06 ("The testimony now questioned faced backward and not forward. This
at
least it did in its most obvious implications. What is even more important, it spoke to a past act,
and, more than that, to an act by some one not the speaker."). The hearsay testimony excluded in
Shepard was a statement made by a dying woman: "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me." Id. at 98.
The testimony was about a past event and was used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, not
to show her state of mind or level of suffering. Id. at 105; see also McFarland, supra note 5, at
928 ("The present tense statement is admissible as state of mind, the past tense statement is not. A
declaration of past state of mind is properly excluded from evidence because it raises the danger
of memory loss and greatly expands the opportunity for insincerity in the statement.").
25 See Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 330 (noting California, Connecticut, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Tennessee reject exception).
26 See United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasizing requirement of
"substantial contemporaneity" between time of observation and hearsay statement (quoting
United States v.Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 2004))); United States v. Woods, 301 F.3d
556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The exception is based on the theory that it is less likely for a declarant
to 'deliberate or conscious[ly] misrepresent' the event if there is 'substantial contemporaneity'
between the statement and the event." (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory
committee's note)); see also Foster, supra note 16, at 300 ("Outright rejection, on hearsay
grounds, of contemporaneous statements which describe the perception of the declarant may
deprive the trier of fact of valuable information .. " (emphasis added)).
27 See United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding maximum of
twenty-three-minute interval admissible as present sense impression); United States v. MejiaVelez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 613-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (ruling 911 call made eighteen minutes after
event was admissible as present sense impression); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 703, 705-07 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (ruling 911 call after approximately ten-minute, 6.3 mile drive
admissible as present sense impression); see also lImwinkelried, supra note 16, at 331 (detailing
various time lapses where present sense impression exception applies); McFarland, supra note 5,
at 920 (describing cases where various lapses in time supported present sense impression
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"event" can expand the scope of the rule even further by tolling the clock,
creating a wider window through which hearsay statements can qualify
under the exception. 281 In addition to substantial contemporaneity, courts
must also consider Crawford v. Washington,29 which folded the
Confrontation Clause into hearsay analysis, requiring a determination of

whether a statement is testimonial or non-testimonial.30

Beyond the

standard hearsay exceptions, Federal Rule 807 also allows for a residual

exception where a trial judge makes a finding that the statement is
trustworthy, is relevant to a material fact, is the most probative evidence,
and admitting such a statement "serve[s] the ... interests of justice.'

exception).
28 See United States v. Hamilton, 948 F. Supp. 635, 639 (W.D. Ky. 1996) (breaking
perception of suspect and identification of that person into two independent events); see also
McFarland, supra note 5, at 922 (describing how some courts link series of events into "single,
continuous event" (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Beck, 122 F.3d 676, 682 (8th Cir.
1997))). McFarland criticizes courts that allow the present sense impression doctrine to "gobble
up" large series of events into a single occurrence. McFarland, supra note 5, at 922-23. He cites
United States v. Beck as a prime example of how a series of connected, yet still independent
events can be merged into a single, large event, thereby greatly expanding the period when
statements can fall into the present sense impression exception. Id. at 922-23 (citing United
States v. Beck, 122 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 1997)). McFarland views Beck as dangerous because long
series of events, occurring over many hours, could be merged, thereby separating the perception
and statements by longer periods of time. Id. In Beck, the court merged a series of transactions
where an informant purchased guns from a defendant, turned them over to police, and then
explained the transaction to police. 122 F.3d at 682.
29 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
30 See id. at 51 (defining testimonial statements as those that create evidence rather than
reacting to present situations); see also United States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 952 (9th Cir.
2012) (analyzing undercover officers' observations as non-testimonial). In Solorio, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined reports made by two undercover officers
were not testimonial in nature. Id. at 952-53. Given the "high-risk situation" of a large drug
exchange, the statements were primarily made for pursuing an arrest, not creating a record for
trial. Id. at 952; see also FED. R. EVID. 807 (detailing residual exception to rule against hearsay).
The residual exception runs a lower risk of implicating Crawford because the best or most
probative evidence rule often requires the declarant to appear in court to testify. See Larez v. City
of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 644 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding quotes in newspaper article not "best
evidence" when reporters available to testify).
31 FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(4) (delineating residual hearsay exception). The residual exception
allows for a judge to admit a hearsay statement if the opposing party is given proper notice and
the following conditions are met:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable
efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice.
FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1)-(4); see also cases cited supra, note 30 (detailing testimonial statements
and best evidence examples).
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The temporal limits of the present sense impression exception
ensure that there is no time for fabrication, calculation, or memory loss by
32
the declarant, thereby bolstering the reliability of the statement.
However, temporal limits have not always been strictly enforced as

accommodations have been made for lapses reaching ten, fourteen, and
eighteen minutes." Various courts and commentators have noted that
statements requiring an "intermediate step" likely fall outside the scope of
803(1).14 Moreover, when statements are made for a "particular reason,"

there is a question of whether the statements35are made contemporaneously,
or are "calculated interpretations of events.
In Hieng, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
began its analysis by noting that Detective Jensen's testimony involved

three levels of hearsay: first, the other officers' statements to Jenson
communicating the number of plants removed; second, Jensen's recording
32

See Waltz, supra note 16, at 880 (detailing contemporaneity of declaration required in

light of rule's use of "simultaneous"); see also Foster, supra note 16, at 322 (reasoning purpose of
exception is to transport trier of fact back to time of incident). Cf H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7079-80 (rejecting additional rule of evidence allowing
hearsay exception for recently perceived events). The proposed rule, which would have been
codified under Rule 804(b)(2), was rejected "as creating a new and unwarranted hearsay
exception of great potential breadth. The Committee did not believe that statements of the type
referred to bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admissibility."
1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7079-80; see also Foster, supra note 16, at 315-16 (discussing rejection of
proposed rule 804(b)(2)).
33 See United States v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 613-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (detailing
two 911 calls occurring over eighteen-minute span); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 703, 705-07 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (allowing testimony of 911 call that occurred after six-mile
drive causing ten-minute delay); United States v. Obayagobona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 339-40
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding fourteen-minute lapse between drug deal and statement acceptable).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding statements
made in response to law enforcement questions about event did not qualify); United States v.
Faust, 850 F.2d 575, 586 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding letter that went through many drafts did not
qualify under exception); Foster, supra note 16, at 314 (describing memory as complex process
that can be interfered with by other mental processes (citing I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception,
Allemory and Hearsay: A Criticism ofPresent Law and the ProposedFederalRules ofEvidence,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 9 (1970)); Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 345 (describing exception
parameters). Professor Foster delineates how memory is influenced by perception. Foster, supra
note 16, at 314. Moreover, she notes a recollected memory is "reconstructed at the time of its
recall with the aid of various factors, such as knowledge acquired prior to the experience, initial
perception of the occurrence, inferences drawn from sensory and perceptual data acquired
subsequent to the event, and the influence of the emotional impact, if any, of the experience." Id.,
at 314. (citing Robert S. Spector & Teree E. Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the
Law ofEvidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 589 (1977)).
35 United States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002) (reasoning statements
addressing FBI agents were calculated and not mere descriptions); Green, 556 F.3d at 157
(statements to DEA agents were reflections on events rather than mere accounts of events); see
also United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that declarant's
hearsay statements calculated because spoke to his attorney).
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of those numbers; and third, his official report.3 6 The majority opinion
outlined how the statements made to Jensen communicating the number of
plants removed qualified under the present sense impression exception to
the rule against hearsay.3 7 Each report to Jensen qualified as an account of
a recent perception because the officers had eradicated a row of plants
immediately prior to the report.38 The majority conceded that the counts
took "some minutes;" however, the observations
were close enough in time
39
to mitigate any possible risk of memory loss.

In a stinging concurrence, Judge Berzon concluded that the present
sense impression was not applicable to the first level of hearsay-the
reports to Jensen. 40 Judge Berzon discussed how the lapse in time between
the start of the counts and the final reporting was significant enough to
raise issues of memory and deception. 4i She further determined that the
mental processes required to collect, destroy, and count the plants
constituted an intermediate step between perception and reporting.42 Judge
Berzon then concluded that the "residual exception" codified under Rule
807 was the most applicable rule to resolve the hearsay issue.4 3 She noted
that the use of the residual exception would mitigate the need for a
Crawford evaluation of whether the statements were testimonial because
that exception requires the "most probative evidence," which would be the
officer's own reports as to their counts.44 Despite the notice requirement of
36 679 F.3d 1131, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing levels of hearsay at issue). The court
handled the second two levels of hearsay the written numbers and his official report by
applying the prior recorded recollection exception, codified in Rule 803(5). Id. That rule allows
for the prior recorded statement to be read into the record if the witness at one time had personal
knowledge of the incident, cannot "fully and accurately" testify about the incident, he or she
made a prior written statement about the incident while it was fresh in the witness's mind, and the
writing "accurately reflects the witness's knowledge" of the incident. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
37 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1141-43 (analyzing hearsay issues); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(1)
(defining present sense impression exception to rule against hearsay).
38 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1142.
39 Id. at 1142 n.2.
40 Id. at 1145-46 (Berzon, J., concurring) (reasoning calculation and time lapse precluded
application of present sense impression exception).
41 Id. at 1147 (Berzon, J., concurring) (citing Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense
Impressions CannotLive in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 914 (2001)).
42 Id. at 1147 (Berzon, J., concurring) (citing Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression
Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWAL. REV. 869 (1981)).
43 See Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1148 (Berzon, J., concurring) ("I am not suggesting we reverse.
Instead, I would rely on what the government does argue that the catchall hearsay exception
applies."); see also FED. R. EVID. 807 (creating residual exception separate from other hearsay
exceptions).
44 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1146 (Berzon, J.,concurring) (detailing possible implication of
Confrontation Clause (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004))); see also FED.
R. EVID. 807 (creating residual hearsay exception).
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Rule 807, Judge Berzon discussed how defense counsel was properly put

on notice of the hearsay as the prosecution tried numerous times to
introduce the plant counts before they were finally admitted.45
In Hieng, the Court of Appeals applied a standard that stretches the
present sense impression exception beyond its breaking point-an issue
correctly articulated in the concurrence by Judge Berzon.46 From its origin
with James Bradley Thayer, the "temporal congruence" linking the
statement to the event has been the lynchpin of the exception.47 Despite
disagreement among academics over whether strict or loose requirements
of contemporaneity should be required, courts have adopted a flexible
standard that is not consistent with the spirit of the exception. 48 Congress

explicitly rejected proposed Rule 804(b)(2), fearing it would create an
"unwarranted hearsay exception of great potential breadth," thereby
unnecessarily expanding the exception to hearsay to include "recently
perceived" events. 49 Clearly supporters of relaxing the requirements for the

45 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1148 (Berzon, J., concurring) (discussing various times defendant put

on notice even though no pretrial notice).
46 Id. at 1146 (Berzon, J., concurring) ("According to the [majority] opinion, the deputies'
calculations were descriptions of the destruction of the marijuana field and therefore admissible
as present sense impressions. That application, however, extends Rule 803(1) well beyond its
limits."); see Foster, supra note 16, at 313 (opining spontaneity and close temporal proximity
necessary to apply present sense impression exception).
47 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (outlining case and source that discuss temporal
link between statement and event described); see also Foster, supra note 16, at 303 (detailing
Thayer's discussion of temporal link between statement and described occurrence); Waltz, supra
note 16, at 871 ("This rule, Thayer said, 'deals ... with statements, oral or written, made by those
present when a thing took place, made about it, and importing what is present at the very time."').
48 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note ("With respect to the time element, [the
present sense impression exception] recognizes that in many, if not most, instances precise
contemporaneity is not possible and hence a slight lapse is allowable." (emphasis added));
McFarland, supra note 5, at 919-20 ("While twenty-three minutes appears to be the longest
,slight lapse' allowed, other decisions have approved the admission of present sense impressions
uttered a few seconds, one minute, three to five minutes, five minutes, seven minutes, five to ten
minutes, ten minutes, fourteen and one-half minutes, and at least eighteen minutes after the
event."); see also cases cited, supra note 27 (outlining various scenarios where courts have
applied present sense impression exception). One of the most often cited cases is United States v.
Blakely, a 1979 case where a lapse of up to twenty-three minutes could have occurred. 607 F.2d
779, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1979). The victim in Blakely had a conversation with a witness after the
defendant made threatening statements to him. Id. at 784. Twenty-three minutes after the threat,
the victim made a phone call. Id. at 786. The hearsay admitted at trial included statements made
to the witness, so the twenty-three minutes represented the longest possible delay, not the actual
delay. Id. at 786. Many academics have strong opinions regarding the various lengths of time
that courts consider to be contemporaneous. Compare McFarland, supra note 5, at 918 (arguing
for strict contemporaneity in applying exception), with Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 348-49
(advocating for looser view of temporal proximity in applying exception).
49 H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7079-80 (rejecting
proposed rule as allowing untrustworthy statements into evidence).
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exception, the Hieng panel did not give adequate consideration to the
temporal delay, to the extra mental processes involved, or to the motivation

of law enforcement officers.50
As both the majority and concurrence note, there were several
minutes between when the officers began destroying and counting the
plants, and reporting their totals to Detective Jensen. 5 Although the break
in time is troublesome, the various mental processes in which the officers
engaged while handling the marijuana operation raise serious concerns:
counting, collecting, destroying, and reporting their totals to fellow police
officers. 52 When there is an intermediate step breaking the direct link
between the perception and the statement, it should not qualify under the
present sense impression exception.5 3 Although the complexity of the
intermediate step may vary, from simple calculation to reports tailored to
specific police inquiry, the results are the same-statements are further

removed from the perceived events.54

50

See Foster, supra note 16, at 305-06 (citing FED. R. EVID. Rule 803 advisory committee's

note) (detailing Congressional endorsement of spontaneity and contemporaneity requirements for
present sense impression exception); Waltz, supra note 16, at 880 ("Because the present sense
impression exception rests so heavily on contemporaneity, that requirement is likely to be
enforced with some rigor, at least when powerful corroboration is lacking." (emphasis added)).
51 Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1142 n.2 (noting time of plant eradication likely took "some
minutes");
id. at 1147 (Berzon, J., concurring) (same); see also United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 155-56
(3d Cir. 2009) ("Put differently, the temporality requirement must be rigorous because the
passage of time or lack thereof is the effective proxy for the reliability of the substance of the
declaration; hence the greater the passage of time, the less truthworty the statement is presumed
to be, and the more the scales should tip toward inadmissibility."); United States v. Ponticelli, 622
F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The more time that elapses between the declaration and the period
about which the declarant is commenting, the less reliable is his statement, because the greater
chance there is that his memory is erroneous."); Foster, supra note 16, at 314 (discussing various
mental processes involved in perception alone).
52 See Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1147 ("Instead, what Jensen testified to was the result of a mental
process counting a series of marijuana plants while they were collected, and, ultimately,
determining how many there were in total."); see also cases cited, infra note 53 (outlining various
hearsay issues).
53 See United States v. Hamilton, 948 F. Supp. 635, 639 (W.D. Ky. 1996) (determining
police identification procedures constituted intermediate step); Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at
345 ("The focus ought to be on the nature of the thought process producing the statement rather
than the substantive content of the statement. When the thought process is complex, involving an
intermediate step between the receipt of the present sense impression and the utterance, the
utterance falls outside the ambit of Rule 803(1)."); see also United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d
832, 840 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding intervening events broke temporal proximity).
54 See Green, 556 F.3d at 157 (determining questions by DEA agents created "reflection"
upon past events); United States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002) (reasoning
declarant's statements made for listening DEA agents not "contemporaneous"); Imwinkelried,
supra note 17, at 346 (noting statements in response to questioning breaks contemporaneity
requirement); see also Alanfre, 368 F.3d at 840 (holding intermediate drive broke proximal link
between statement and event).
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Academics disagree over whether a declarant's motivation to lie or
misrepresent facts should go to the weight or admissibility of the
evidence.55 In Hieng, the minimum mandatory sentence triggered when the

detectives recovered over 1000 marijuana plants raises the specter of
whether the detectives had a significant motive to fabricate or misstate their
totals.56 At least some courts have been leery in admitting statements when
law enforcement is involved, especially when statements have significant
legal consequences.57 Lastly, the Crawford analysis further implicates
many statements made to or by police officers, further complicating the

trial court's duties.58 When there is a time lapse coupled with a motive to
fabricate statements, a defendant has a strong argument that he or she has a
fundamental right to examine that witness to probe the possible biases
affecting perception of an event. 59

55 Compare McFarland, supra note 5, at 926-27 (discussing motivation to lie as question of
admissibility), and Foster, supra note 16, at 334-35 (proposing corroboration requirement for
admission of present sense impression hearsay), and Waltz, supra note 16, at 880 (discussing
corroboration requirement as necessary for admission), with Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 34850 (arguing motive to lie should affect weight of evidence not admissibility).
56 See Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1135 (noting defendant sentenced to minimum incarceration often

years). The total number of plants counted by the detectives was 1109, relatively close to the
1000-plant requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii). Id. at 1135-36. In this case, although
no evidence of miscount was presented at trial, the detectives may have "harbor[ed] some motive
to falsify, or at least slant, [their] statement[s]" to bring the plant count over 1000. See Foster,
supra note 16, at 301 (detailing motive to lie as factor in evaluating admissibility under present
sense impression exception).
57 See Green, 556 F.3d at 155 (stating declarant's statements inadmissible because resulted
from questioning by DEA agents); Woods, 301 F.3d at 562 (reasoning declarant's taped narrative
to officers inadmissible because statements made for police's benefit); United States v. Ponticelli,
622 F.2d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding declarant's hearsay statements calculated because
spoke to his attorney); Hamilton, 948 F. Supp. at 639 (ruling police identification procedures
inadmissible as response to officer provocations).
58 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) (holding testimonial hearsay
statements subject to Confrontation Clause protections); United States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943,
953 (9th Cir. 2012) (reasoning officers reporting observations as part of undercover drug buy
non-testimonial); see also Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1147 (outlining various temporal limits imposed by
courts); cases cited supra note 53 (same).
59 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 ("Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation."). The statements of the detectives in Hieng had significant
legal consequences because the number of plants destroyed directly correlated with the severity of
the charges. See Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1135 (noting mandatory sentence required when more than
1000 plants involved). Similar to statements made to police by other individuals, statements
between officers that are not in high-risk or high-danger situations are more akin to evidence
collection than to furthering immediate police investigation. See Solorio, 669 F.3d at 952-53
(holding reports non-testimonial and necessary given high-risk situation); see also, e.g. Green,
556 F.3d at 157 ("Brown's statement in this case is problematic ...
because the statement was
only made after he had been questioned by DEA agents about the details of the transaction the
statement purports to describe."); Woods, 301 F.3d at 562 ("These statements were made for the
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United States v. Hieng is just one in a long line of cases that have
put further strain on the present sense impression exception to hearsay
exclusion. Arguing in her concurrence, Judge Berzon represents a strong
voice of reason and moderation preaching to a judiciary that insists on
continually molding an exception into a norm. It is clear Congress did not
do enough by rejecting proposed rule 804(b)(2); it will take a wholesale
modification of rule 803(1)'s language to ensure the spirit of the exception
is renewed. While the present sense impression exception continues to
cover more and more hearsay, it has expelled most reasonable limits. Only
with Congressional action will present sense once again coexist with
common sense.
ChristopherLynett

benefit of the agents i.e., were calculated and provided for a reason and are not admissible
under the present sense impression exception."); Ponticell, 622 F.2d at 992 (holding statements
to lawyer after arrest were not present sense impressions because of legal implications).

